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ABSTRACT
Because of its popularity, there is now a large literature examining how participatory budgeting (PB)
deepens participation by the poor and redistributes resources. Closer examinations of recent cases of PB
can help us to better understand the political configurations in which these new participatory democratic
spaces are embedded, and articulate the conditions that might lead to more meaningful outcomes. Who
participates? For whose benefit? The articles in this symposium, on participatory budgeting in New York
City (PBNYC), highlight both strengths and challenges of the largest American PB process. They focus
less on redistribution, more on the dimensions of the process itself and of PBNYC’s successful social
inclusion, new dynamics between participants and local politicians, and the subtleties of
institutionalization. The symposium also reminds us, however, that contestations over meaningful
participation are on-going, and that of all of PBNYC’s multiple goals, equity has proven to be the most
elusive.
INTRODUCTION
Participatory Budgeting (PB)— a process in which community members, rather than elected officials, decide
how to allocate public funds— has received tremendous attention since it first began in Porto Alegre, Brazil in
1989, spreading to over three thousand cities worldwide. Since 2010 alone, PB has spread from a single local
process in the United States (US) to a projected forty-five district, city, or institutional processes this year.
Community organizing coalitions like Right to the City have advocated for PB as one means of reclaiming the
commons, and President Obama announced PB as a key element of a recent “Open Government” initiative.1
Still, as PB continues to gain traction, there remain questions as to whether PB can sustain engagement
among the traditionally disenfranchised and help engender a more equitable reallocation of public funds,
as in well-known past cases. 2 Some researchers have argued that PB now runs the risk of becoming a
buzzword-turned-fuzzword, an empowering and democratizing process that diffused and watered down
into a politically malleable, innocuous set of procedures. 3 Given these concerns, the need for careful,
empirically grounded analysis has not escaped the notice of academics. The Journal of Public Deliberation,

See the White House press release on “Transparency and Open Government,” available online at: http://1.usa.gov/1dltUiU
(accessed March 17, 2014).
2 Brian Wampler, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation, and Accountability (University Park, Pa:
Pennsylvania State Press, 2010).
3 Gianpaolo Baiocchi and Ernesto Ganuza, “Participatory Budgeting as if Emancipation Mattered,” Politics & Society 42:1
(2014), pp. 29–50.
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for instance, published a special issue on the proliferation of PB around the world in late 2012. 4 New
Political Science published a preliminary analysis of Chicago’s process in one ward in 2014. 5
In this symposium, we focus on the implications of PB in North America, for both practitioners and
academics. We focus on New York City because, while it may be the second oldest PB process in the US, it
is also by far the largest, affecting more than 4 million city residents. And, for better or worse, New
York’s policies (whether Giuliani’s “quality of life” policing or Bloomberg’s mayoral controls of schools)
receive attention nationwide, and are often emulated. Participatory budgeting in New York City
(PBNYC), for both its magnitude and its potential as a model to be copied, has become a decisive case to
critically examine. Substantively, the case allows us to engage critical, on-going debates on immigrant
political participation and incorporation, governmental legitimacy and public trust, the institutionalization
and diffusion of democratic experiments, racial inequalities, and participatory action research.
RISING INTEREST IN PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY
In recent decades, the largely parallel domestic and international literatures on participatory decisionmaking have begun to intersect more consistently and substantively. In the inter- national development
literature, examinations of participation were inspired by the need for constituents throughout the Global
South to have a say in the mass-scale dam projects, economic policies, and other governmental (or
government-binding) decisions being made by elites. 6 Examinations of participatory democratic
experiments grew in the 1990s, as policy-makers in post-apartheid South Africa, post-dictatorship
Argentina and Brazil, and other contexts attempted to implement new forms of democratic governance;
they worked to implement alternatives to the liberal, representative, electoral models with which Americans
are most familiar. 7 Yet, by the early 2000s, practitioners and scholars had already begun to call
“participatory frameworks” the “new tyranny,” a way for funders and institutions to pay lip service to
participation while perpetuating status quo inequalities. 8 “Community participation” might bring policymaking closer to the people, but it might also burden individuals to assume responsibilities that had
traditionally been those of the welfare state. 9
In the American context, record low levels of trust in government, the decline of civic engagement, and
the professionalization of American political participation have prompted academic interest in political
participation stateside, too. 10 These patterns have also led to popular pressures to experiment with

See the “The Spread of Participatory Budgeting Across the Globe: Adoption, Adaptation, and Impacts,” Journal of Public
Deliberation 8:2, available online at: http://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss2/ (accessed October 30, 2016).
5 LaShonda M Stewart et al., “Participatory Budgeting in the United States: A Preliminary Analysis of Chicago’s 49th Ward
Experiment,” New Political Science 36:2 (2014), pp. 193–218.
6 Robert Chambers, Whose Reality Counts?: Putting the First Last (London, UK: Intermediate Technology Publications,
1997).
7 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Democratizing Democracy: Beyond the Liberal Democratic Canon (New York, NY: Verso
Books, 2005).
8 Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari, Participation: The New Tyranny? (London, UK: ed Books, 2001).
9 Julia Paley, Marketing Democracy: Power and Social Movements in Post-Dictatorship Chile (Berkeley, ca: University of
California Press, 2001).
10 Theda Skocpol, “Voice and Inequality: The Transformation of American Civic Democracy,” Perspectives on Politics 2:1
(2004), pp. 3–20; Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York, NY: Simon
and Schuster, 2001); Daniel Feldman, “The Legitimacy of US Government Agency Power,” Public Administration Review
75:1 (2015), pp. 75–84.
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alternative forms of bottom-up accountability and participatory governance. 11 Social movements like
Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter have spoken to the need to not just implement new policies in
the US to address social inequalities, but also reform how we make decisions in the first place. 12 It is in
this context that PB arrived in the US in 2009, when a single Chicago Alderman, Joe Moore, devoted part
of his ward’s discretionary funds to the process. Since then, it has spread across the country; as of this
writing, there are currently 18 city-based PB processes in the US. PB is also striking as a prominent case
of the US adopting a process developed by middle-income countries, rather than acting as the vanguard
in innovative, state-of-the-art policies.
Yet, as distrust of government increases, and as participatory programs proliferate across a range of
contexts in both the Global North and the Global South, tensions embedded in democratic experiments’
potential for both empowerment and co-optation have only deepened. 13 Could deliberative spaces actually
reify traditional power dynamics, reflecting subtle domination by elites or legitimizing pro forma decisions
by policy-makers? 14 The case of PB is ripe for an analysis of changing dynamics between everyday
constituents and government officials, especially non-elected ones.
Because of its popularity, there is now a large literature examining how PB deepens participation by the
poor, increases efficiency, and redistributes resources. By far the most prominent example of participatory
democracy globally and in North America, PB is usually conducted at the municipal level. 15, 16 PB
attempts to give stakeholders an opportunity to draw upon their knowledge of local needs, articulate
proposals, interact with neighbors, deliberate over priorities, and select—not just consult on—which
proposals receive funding. Rather than prescribing universal templates for participation, this literature has
moved beyond vanguard models (Kerala, Porto Alegre, et cetera) to emphasize the particular, contextspecific manifestations of discursive and contested politics in these experiments, especially in diverse and
unequal landscapes. 17

Hollie Russon Gilman, Democracy Reinvented: Participatory Budgeting and Civic Innovation in America (Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016).
12 Occupy Wall Street and social inequalities overall were frequent topics of conversation at the PB neighborhood assemblies I
attended in 2011–2012, and the Executive Director of the Participatory Budgeting Project, Josh Lerner, presented to groups
such as Occupy Baltimore in 2011. The Black Lives Matter platform for policy demands, available at
https://policy.m4bl.org/platform/, focuses on process-oriented demands in community control (including PB) and political
power, alongside outcomes-oriented demands in criminal justice, economic justice, reparations, and social rights.
13 Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory
Governance (New York, NY: Verso Books, 2003); Andrea Cornwall and Vera Schatten Coelho, Spaces for Change?: The
Politics of Citizen Participation in New Democratic Arenas (London, UK: Zed Books, 2007).
14 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” Social Text
24:26 (1990), pp. 56–80; Bent Flyvbjerg, “Habermas and Foucault: Thinkers for Civil Society?,” The British Journal of
Sociology 49:2 (1998), pp. 210–233.
15 Brian Wampler and Janette Hartz-Karp, “Participatory Budgeting: Diffusion and Outcomes Across the World,” Journal of
Public Deliberation 8:2 (2012) available at http://www.publicdeliberation.net/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1241&context=jpd.
16 Josh Lerner, Making Democracy Fun: How Game Design Can Empower Citizens and Transform Politics (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2014); Brian Wampler, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation, and Accountability
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010).
17 Hilary Silver, Alan Scott, and Yuri Kazepov, “Participation in Urban Contention and Deliberation,” International Journal of
Urban and Regional Research 34:3 (2010), pp. 453–477; Archon Fung, “Putting the Public Back into Governance: The
Challenges of Citizen Participation and its Future,” Public Administration Review 75:4 (2015) pp. 513–522.
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Peck and Theodore warn that PB risks becoming “technocratically canned … and marketed for [mass]
consumption.” 18 Closer examinations of recent cases of PB can help us to not only better understand how
everyday citizens can better participate in democracy, but also to examine the political configurations in
which these new participatory spaces are embedded, pinpoint the tensions bureaucrats face in these new
systems of shared governance, and articulate the conditions that might lead to more meaningful
outcomes. Who participates? For whose benefit?
NYC’S PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING PROCESS
The PBNYC process aims to make civic engagement processes more inclusive, and in doing so, it also
aims for more equitable outcomes. The breadth of its goals reflects this, so that the quality of the process
itself may be considered an outcome as well. According to the Rulebook, PBNYC works to: 1. Open up
government, expanding transparency, 2. Expand civic engagement, engaging more people (especially
traditionally marginalized groups) in politics, 3. Develop new community leaders, 4. Build community by
connecting participants with one another and with organizations, and 5. Make public spending more
equitable.
PB first came to New York in 2011 in a pilot program, with four participating New York City
Councilmembers devoting a portion of their discretionary funds to the process. Since then, it has grown
in scale each year. In the 2015–2016 cycle, almost sixty-seven thousand NYC residents voted to help
allocate more than thirty-eight million dollars in discretionary funds, across twenty-eight districts. 19 In its
sixth cycle in 2016–2017, thirty-one Councilmembers, a majority of the fifty-one in the city, are
participating.
Individual Councilmembers opt-in to the PB process, and dedicate at least one million dollars of their
discretionary funds for PB projects in their district each cycle. Many devote roughly one and a half million
dollars. Together, residents in thirty-one districts are projected to allocate at least forty million dollars of
funds in the 2016–2017 cycle. 20
This remains a small—miniscule, even—percentage of the city budget. In the 2017 fiscal year, the city’s
expense budget totaled eighty-two billion dollars, and the capital budget totaled sixteen billion dollars. 21
Although a fraction of these budgets remain uncommitted and discretionary, the point remains that PB, as
a process, is the exception rather than the rule in NYC municipal budgeting.
PB funds are also largely capital funds. Such funds can be used for physical infrastructure that costs at
least thirty-five thousand dollars. and has a lifespan of at least five years. In contrast, expense funds
may be used for programs or services, or smaller, one-time infrastructural expenditures. Thus, curb
extensions to increase pedestrian safety and new technology for schools are considered capital projects,
whereas temporary art exhibits, after-school tutoring, or other staff-dependent programming are
considered expense pro- jects. A few districts began experimenting with small pots (~ fifty thousand
Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore, Fast Policy (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), p. 177.
See http://labs.council.nyc/pb/results/ on the New York City Council website for cycle 5 results (accessed October 30,
2016).
20 See http://labs.council.nyc/pb/participate/ on the New York City Council website for cycle 6 information (accessed October
30, 2016).
21 See http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/omb/downloads/pdf/sum4-16.pdf for the NYC expense budget and
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/omb/downloads/pdf/ccp_10_16a.pdf for the capital budget.
18
19
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dollars) of expense PB funds in 2015–2016; generally, however, PB projects must be capital projects.
This means that laptop computers for a school lab might be eligible, but tablets are not. These restrictions
are not always intuitive; for instance, air conditioners and outdoor murals are also ineligible. Landfill
closure is not, but methane collection is.
The process is governed by the PBNYC Rulebook, which lays out core goals of the PB process, a
timeline, guidelines for structuring the process (such as holding neighborhood assemblies targeted to
traditionally marginalized communities), and rules for eligible participants. 22 The process is overseen by
the PBNYC Steering Committee, with representatives from community-based organizations,
Councilmembers and staff, PB participants, and other stakeholders. The Participatory Budgeting Project
(PBP) and Community Voices Heard (CVH) provide technical assistance on the PB process and grassroots
engagement. This steering committee supports and guides the process, conducts an end-of cycle evaluation,
and revises and approves the PBNYC Rulebook annually. Since 2014, the City Council has also worked
to coordinate efforts city-wide, and to host the steering committee.
A typical PB annual cycle might unfold as follows: In the fall, each City Councilmember hosts
neighborhood assemblies throughout his or her district, and hundreds of New Yorkers attend to pitch
proposals for community projects. Since New York’s PB process is run by district, each district has a list
of hundreds of project ideas to vet by November.
Over each winter, residents volunteer to become budget delegates, curating the proposals that will end up on
the ballot. City Councilmembers’ staff might also help budget delegates to vet out ineligible project ideas.
Budget delegates work in teams, mostly organized by policy arena (and the relevant city agencies
implementing these policies)—such as parks, education, or libraries. Some districts boast of committees
organized by demographic groups, like youth. Beyond ascertaining eligibility, budget delegate teams
might conduct formal needs assessments, work to “bundle” smaller projects, and conduct site visits to perform due diligence on proposed ideas to help their vetting process. Budget delegates might also consider
political factors, such as which projects are likely to garner votes as ballot items; a well-vetted project that
would consume most of the individual Councilmembers’ respective one million to one and a half million
dollar PB budgets, for instance, might not succeed when most residents wish to see multiple projects
funded. Finally, they also work to flesh out details on proposals, so that they may then attain accurate
cost figures from city agencies and vouch for feasibility before the proposals land on ballots. In the
2015–2016 cycle, City Council adopted a new policy stating that each city agency would only closely
examine five project proposals per district. Thus, budget delegate teams might be sifting through as many as
one hundred fifty ideas, to forward just five to the next phase of the process.
Each spring, residents vote on the project proposals; those that garner the most votes win funding. Every
year, several Councilmembers also choose to fund runner-up projects with discretionary funds they did not
originally allot to PB. Beyond this timeline and minimum Rulebook guidelines, individual city council
districts have great discretion in how many neighborhood assemblies they host, how much hand-holding
or training the budget delegates receive, or what the voting sites look like.
CONTESTATIONS IN PBNYC
The 2016–2017 Rulebook is available at http://labs.council.nyc/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/PBNYc-2016_2017Rulebook.pdf.
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At least some of the most prominent, earlier PB cases were built upon strong civil society organizations;
in Porto Alegre, for instance, community associations that helped to mobilize for democratization in Brazil
were also participants in PB there. 23 American PB, in contrast, has focused on individuals, rather than
community associations or organizations, as participants. In NYC, community organizations such as CVH
and Arts & Democracy Project play integral roles in PB as organizers, trainers, and facilitators serving
individuals, but not as representative membership organizations themselves. In a context of great racial
and economic diversity, low levels of trust in government, and low levels of membership in formal civil
society organizations, 24 PBNYC faces particular challenges in engaging stakeholders, especially those
from traditionally marginalized communities.
In their article, Hayduk, Hackett, and Folla specifically focus on the successes and challenges of
immigrant participation and political incorporation in NYC PB. Both documented and undocumented
immigrants are eligible to participate in PB, and targeted outreach and language access have helped the
process to engage foreign-born residents at impressive rates; twenty-eight percent of all voters in the
2014–2015 cycle, for instance, were foreign-born. 25 Nevertheless, Hayduk, Hackett, and Folla’s analysis
suggests that language access, material and logistical constraints, and fear of exposure related to
immigration status shape the immigrant PB experience in compounded ways, both affectively and
materially.
Research on PBNYC’s first cycle in 2011–2012 suggests that American PB’s central strength lies in its civic
rewards, including greater knowledge about local government, direct contact with government officials,
and leadership development. 26 Contextualizing PB in on-going debates about declining public trust in
government, Swaner’s article in this symposium argues that in communities that practice PB, local
residents did express trust in government and in elected officials. Strikingly, this was not because they
thought that more equitable decisions were being made. Rather, they expressed feeling connected to one
another and better understanding the complexities of local government in meaningful ways. In Swaner’s
analysis, participants also articulated contrasts between elected and unelected officials in the PB process,
pinpointing how PB increases public legitimacy for some governmental actors but not others.
Whereas the articles by Swaner and Hayduk, Hackett, and Folla focus on the participation of individuals in
PBNYC, the articles by Jabola-Carolus and Su in this symposium ask questions regarding contestations over
the institutional design and prevailing logics of “good projects” in PBNYC, respectively. These two
articles particularly raise questions about the tensions that arise when PBNYC, a social justice project,
operates within a larger administrative state. These tensions are perhaps particularly acute in PBNYC
because the process did not come about in a moment of democratization and profound administrative
changes, as in some of the earlier cases in Latin America. At the same time, the decisions in PBNYC are
binding and have more consequences than many of the European PB processes, which tend to be largely
consultative. 27

Baiocchi and Ganuza, “Participatory Budgeting as if Emancipation Mattered.”
Stephen Macedo et al., Democracy at Risk: How Political Choices Have Undermined Citizenship and What We Can Do
About It (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005).
25 Alexa Kasdan and Erin Markman, “A People’s Budget: Cycle 4: Key Research Findings,” (New York, NY: Community
Development Project at the Urban Justice Center, 2015).
26 Gilman, Democracy Reinvented: Participatory Budgeting and Civic Innovation in America.
27 Yves Sintomer, Carsten Herzberg, and Anja Röcke, “Participatory Budgeting in Europe: Potentials and Challenges,”
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 32:1 (2008), pp. 164–178.
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Jabola-Carolus examines the institutional design of PBNYC’s administrative functions, specifically
through a close analysis of the cross-district Steering Committee. He asks how and why the shift in
coordination from civil society organizations to central City Council offices impacted the mechanisms of
popular control over PB and the prospects for PB expansion. Amidst bureaucratic institutionalization,
Jabola-Carolus reveals on-going contestations of politics and power. Administrative capacity increased, but
civil society influence decreased; this prompted new calls for reform regarding the governance of PBNYC
itself. The evolution of PBNYC governance in its first five years thus points to the need for continued
political will and repeated re-negotiations in collaboration—involving both cooperation and
contestation—in successful state-civil society co-governing participatory institutions.
Su’s article examines how the New York PB process has worked to simultaneously disrupt and maintain
racial hierarchies, using a Critical Race Theory lens. I argue that while PBNYC has successfully reached
out to and effectively enfranchised traditionally marginalized constituents, current criteria for “good
projects” limit PB’s transformative potential to problematize larger funding formulas and further address
racial inequalities. To truly pursue racial equity, PB must enable participants to trouble the larger logics in
which municipal budgeting and related policy regimes (including policing, for instance) operate.
Because all of the symposium authors are past or present members of the PBNYC research board, our
articles are reflective not just of our respective efforts, but also collective ones. In their article, Kasdan and
Markman outline the participatory action research (PAR) principles that shape the research board’s work. In
PBNYC, a PAR approach demanded constant re-negotiations on division of labor and priorities in the coproduction/collection, co-analysis, and co-ownership of data, rather than a specific set of methodologies.
Informing and helping to improve the process, rather than speaking to theoretical literatures, served as the
primary goal. Kasdan and Markman underline the importance of adhering to PAR principles in such
policy-oriented work. They examine questions of reflexivity in emphasizing impact validity in this
work, 28 as well as tensions regarding what constitutes community-based and participatory research along
the way. They argue that as PBNYC continues to expand, meaningful and inclusive participation in
research and evaluation becomes more difficult without substantive resources.
In the conclusion, PBP founder and Executive Director Josh Lerner reflects upon the symposium’s
practical implications, emphasizes the impacts of PB as a movement, and re-contextualizes the PBNYC
case in PBP’s national work. Lerner argues that to address the challenges presented in this symposium,
political leaders must take “bold steps” to deepen PB in New York and elsewhere. In addition to
suggesting expanded project eligibility and funding, and scaling up to the city level, he calls for specific,
crucial investments in equity.
EMERGING THEMES AND QUESTIONS
Taken together, these articles assure us that PBNYC, the largest American PB process, is not
implementing PB as a watered down, good governance exercise in the name of social justice. Whereas
previous iterations of PB focused on redistribution, we know a lot more about dimensions of the process
itself and of social inclusion, of dynamics between participants and local politicians, and of the subtleties
of institutionalization. PBNYC focuses our attention on who gets to exercise citizenship. The symposium
also reminds us, however, that contestations over meaningful participation are on-going, and that of all of

28

Sean Massey and Ricardo Barreras, “Introducing ‘Impact Validity’,” Journal of Social Issues 69:4 (2013), pp. 615–632.
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PBNYC’s five goals, the last—equity—has proven to be the most elusive. A particular puzzle lies in how
and why inclusion does not necessarily lead to redistribution.
The first clue to why equity is so challenging to achieve lies in the diversity of experiences and outcomes
thus far; the diversity is itself a finding. In such a decentralized, council district-driven system, it is
difficult to confidently report city-wide findings. That, combined with long timelines for project
implementation and frankly, meager research budgets (and in many districts, a scarcity of data on where
project proposals come from), has rendered longitudinal studies on outcomes much more difficult to
conduct than studies on process and participation. The federalized system also prevents residents from
addressing inequalities in a segregated landscape or address economies of scale across districts. Indeed,
the relative small scale of PBNYC is another recurring motif; stakeholders repeatedly asserted that PB
cannot operate meaningfully as a marginal exercise in the city budget. Without careful expansion,
PBNYC can act as a release valve for frustrated residents and help some to address small-scale needs, but
it will not necessarily help to address redistribution or equity.
The articles in this symposium challenge academics and practitioners to re-evaluate the contours of PB, to
examine what constraints are helpful, and to pinpoint where we should open up the process and broaden
the possibilities of PB in our popular imagination. In Brazil, capital funding constraints aided the process in
making outcomes more concrete and more likely to be redistributive; 29 such constraints may not be so
helpful in the US. To address these concerns, PBP, Steering Committee members, and other key
stakeholders have begun to discuss alternative ways of organizing PBNYC, such as implementing crossdistrict, themed (focused on public health, for instance, or the arts) processes.
Second, the articles suggest that the small budgets mentioned above work in tandem with neoliberal
austerity economics. Given limited budgets, it makes sense that the public might want to signal their
priorities to elected officials, and to work towards bottom-up accountability. Politicians see this frustration,
and several newly elected NYC Councilmembers ran on platforms promising to adopt PB in their respective
districts.
At the same time, neoliberal logics of welfare retrenchment are pervasive. Combined with small PB
budgets, this has emphasized “bang for the buck” discourses and criteria regarding which projects move
forward and get funded. At its extreme, this dynamic embodies almost a market, consumer choice model
rather than a deliberative one, with representatives giving pitches for PB funds, and telling delegates exactly
what projects need funding in their neighborhoods. In interviews I conducted with city agency
representatives, some made statements such as, “We jumped in right away, [be]cause we already had a
well-oiled machine when it came to soliciting funds, so we just tailored that towards PB.” 30
A crucial next challenge for PBNYC thus lies in directing public attention towards questions of political
economy, so that constituents confront public officials with questions of tax revenues and larger-scale
inequalities, as well as budget allocations. The articles in this symposium suggest that in order to reach
such macropolitical goals, practitioners of PB must attend to the micropolitics of PB—that is, in addressing
the material conditions and logistical barriers to immigrant participation, how bureaucrats (such as city
agencies) can earn public trust alongside elected officials, how decisions are negotiated between
Rebecca Abers, “From Clientelism to Cooperation: Local Government, Participatory Policy, and Civic Organizing in Porto
Alegre, Brazil,” Politics & Society 26 (1998), pp. 511–538.
30 Interview with city agency representatives, 5 august 2014.
29
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government officials and civil society organizations in the steering committee, and whose expertise and
knowledge are valued in deciding what “feasible” and “good” projects look like.
Third, these micropolitical contestations suggest that designs of participatory democratic process are far
from fixed. Rather, they are dynamic, continually constructed and contested by multiple sets of actors,
with changing goals, cultural practices, and material conditions and resources. The institutional location
of both the process and each set of key players matters; “communities” and “governmental actors” should
not be homogenized.
Through its challenges, PBNYC has helped to create a new arena of politics in the city. Rather than
aiming for resolutions to these contestations or “perfect” institutional designs, the articles in this
symposium suggest that further research be devoted to how this new arena of politics, between top-down
and bottom-up governance, operates.
With the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, such democratic experiments have
only become more urgent. Amidst secrecy, large-scale privatization, and demagoguery in a seemingly
post-truth world, processes like PB aim to bring back transparency, notions of community and the
commons, and discussions rooted in concrete experiences and facts. Amidst toxic bigotry, how can such
processes help communities to adjudicate disagreements in constructive ways, and to shift analyses from
individuals (or demographic groups) to policies and institutions of power? How can stakeholders mobilize
to further open this arena of participatory democracy, and to multiply generative contestations for power
in decision-making? What practices, under what conditions, can then empower PB participants to
question larger logics and systems of governance and political economy? We hope this symposium
contributes to such research.
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